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Abstract
Transferring data is one of the key operations performed by millions of users every day. Users
do this by issuing direct commands, such as file transfer commands, or indirectly as a feature
invoked by numerous end-user applications. The most important security characteristic of a
successful data exchange is the integrity of that data. The receiver user desires to acquire
data that has not been modified through malicious acts, or simple human or machine error.
Applications that rely on the Transfer Control Protocol (TCP) as the main mechanism to
provide end-to-end reliability, including error and sequence control, do not check the
integrity of the file being transmitted prior to the transfer. In this paper, we present an
overview of current data transfer mechanisms and their security provisions and propose an
internal integrity mechanism that provides a triangulation means of error control through the
use of one-way hash functions based on the original file being transferred; and a discussion
of the implications and limitations that such a mechanism imparts on data transfer
mechanisms.
Keywords: Secure Data Transfers, Integrity, Error Recovery, Triangulation, Hash Triplet.
Introduction
Data transfers constitute one of the most commonly performed tasks in the Internet today.
Users publishing files to a website, moving files that are too large for an email application,
transferring files securely between different computers, uploading photos to services such as
Flickr (www.flickr.com) or backing up a to a remote server are all engaged in data transfer
operations. File Transfer Protocol (FTP), for example, is still used to perform bulk data
transfers across networks (Grzywa et al. 2001). It is important to note that this simple-
sounding task (data transfer) is essential for the interoperation of networked computers,
especially when the different computing environments of modern heterogeneous networks are
taken into account. Potential user devices in the network range from Personal Digital
Assistants (PDAs) and mobile phones to specialized servers and large-scale corporate
systems. All of these devices could operate using different word formats; they might store the
data in different forms and forward their packets in non-compatible ways (big-endian vs.
little-endian computers) (Tanenbaum 2003).
Ask yourself a few simple questions. Do you know how secure data transfers really are? Can
you really trust the file you just received? Was the file you just spent an hour downloading
corrupted before you began the download? It is these fundamental questions that drive the
continued improvement efforts to provide a data transfer protocol that does its job well and
does not waste the user’s time, money, and energy.
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Let us examine the case of FTP, one of the traditional techniques to perform data transfer.
There are many different data transfer protocols but FTP is perhaps the best example for the
presentation of our ideas. When a communication is initiated, two connections are established
for the session. The first is a control channel that is used to coordinate the connections and
bulk transfers, and the second is the data channel (Postel & Reynolds 1985). The
authentication of the identity of the users and the application of data and control channel
confidentiality outlined by Brown & Jaatun (1992) has been enacted through the use of FTP
security extensions. These extensions utilize established security mechanisms, such as Public-
Key Infrastructure and Kerberos, through the use of the Generic Security Services Application
Program Interface (GSS-API) in order to provide authentication of the user, data transfer
integrity, and confidentiality on both the control and data channels (Horowitz & Lunt 1997).
It is in the area of file integrity that we propose an alternative solution.
In FTP, the integrity of the file is perhaps the most important security aspect. The user desires
to acquire a file that has not been modified through malicious acts, or simple human or
machine error. FTP has “no provision for detecting bits lost or scrambled in data transfer”
(Postel & Reynolds 1985). It does utilize Transfer Control Protocol (TCP) for this process,
coupled with a marker code inserted into the data stream for restarting the transfer when the
data is corrupted or the transfer is interrupted. More notably, FTP does not check the integrity
of the file being transmitted prior to the transfer. Other applications (such as TFTP and
Remote Network File Sharing) have the same weakness. In this paper, we present an integrity
mechanism that operates during the data transfer session that provides a triangulation means
of error control through the use of one-way hash functions based on the original file being
transferred; and a discussion of the implications and limitations that such a mechanism
imparts on the data exchange. By “triangulation” we mean introducing a mechanism that
points at the location where possible transmission error occurred.
Overview of data transfer mechanisms
There are two main approaches to perform data transfers in today’s IP-based networks. One is
based on FTP and several variations to that protocol and the second, and much newer,
approach is based on peer-to-peer networking configurations. Let’s review both of them.
FTP Overview
Essentially, FTP is a client-server protocol that facilitates the transfer of files between two
computers connected via a network, such as the Internet (Brown & Jaatun 1992). The protocol
has several fundamental components that perform the required functions for establishing the
sessions between systems, and coordinates the transfer of the files. These components are as
follows:
• Server-FTP that consists of the Server Protocol Interpreter and the Server Data Transfer
Process;
• Server-side File System;
• User-FTP that consists of the User Interface, User Protocol Interpreter, and the User Data
Transfer Process;
• User-side File System;
• A User; and
• A communication channel for the control and data connections.
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The FTP architecture is displayed below (see Figure 1):
Figure 1: FTP Architecture (Postel & Reynolds 1985)
An alternative configuration of FTP provides for the transfer between two servers through a
third system that provides the control function between the servers. In both of the
configurations, FTP requires that the control channel be open during the data transfer process
(Postel & Reynolds 1985).
Telnet authentication and encryption
As previously discussed, FTP utilizes the control connection to coordinate the data connection
and execute commands on the File Systems of both the user and the server. FTP utilizes the
Telnet protocol to execute the commands (Postel & Reynolds 1985). This fundamental design
lends itself to security breaches that may permit eavesdropping of user ID’s, passwords, file
names, and other information passed through the control channel. It also may allow an active
attacker to change settings and execute commands on the file system (Brown & Jaatun 1992).
This fundamental security flaw was initially addressed when Borman (1993) proposed the
passing of authentication information, and a mechanism to enable encryption of the data after
successful authentication for the Telnet protocol. The result was that user passwords would
not be sent in clear text, and the data stream would be encrypted utilizing any general
authentication and encryption system. However, it should noted that the “Telnet
authentication and encryption option does not provide for integrity protection only (without
confidentiality), and does not address the protection of the data channel” (Horowitz & Lunt
1997).
Security Extensions
In 1992, Brown & Jaatun detailed a set of security extensions for the FTP utility in the
TCP/IP suite. The extensions provide authentication of the user, and encryption of the data at
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varying levels of security for both the control and data channels. In summary, FTP Security
Extensions impart the following:
• User authentication that surpasses the original password mechanism;
• Server authentication;
• Session parameter negotiation that includes encryption keys and attributes;
• Command connection protection including transmission integrity, confidentiality of the
data and/or control commands, or both; and
• Data transfer protection including transmission integrity, confidentiality of the data and/or
control commands, or both. (Housley et al. 2000)
When using security extensions, the systems involved in the transfer process negotiate an
agreed security mechanism. Once agreed to, the authentication process begins. The server
may require additional security information and invoke a security data exchange (Housley et
al. 2000). It should be noted that the systems might not agree on a security mechanism and
continue the normal processes due to mechanism incompatibilities or the non-existence of
such mechanisms on one or both systems. Provided that the security mechanisms exist and are
agreed on, and all needed security information is transferred and confirmed, the two systems
are then considered to form a security association. This association will contain the needed
information to perform authentication, and keying information for integrity and
confidentiality providing they are a part of the previous mechanism negotiated (Horowitz &
Lunt 1997). The association is maintained throughout the rest of the session. There are four
levels of protection that can be provided in a security association. The first is Clear, which
indicates no security is in effect. The second is Safe, which indicates integrity confirmation
will be applied to the data. The third is Confidential, which indicates the data will be
encrypted. The forth is Private, which indicates integrity confirmation and encryption
(Horowitz & Lunt 1997). One major weakness to this approach is that when data transfers are
to be authenticated, “the authentication checks are performed on individual blocks of the file,
rather than on the file as a whole” (Horowitz & Lunt 1997) allowing insertion attacks in the
data stream resulting in corrupted files. FTP Security Extensions rely on the external security
mechanisms to correct this flaw (Horowitz & Lunt 1997).
Encryption using KEA and SKIPJACK in FTP
In order to further formalize and develop the security mechanisms available to FTP, Housley
et al. (2000) proposed the Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) in conjunction with the
SKIPJACK symmetric encryption algorithm to be incorporated into the security extensions.
They further go on to specify the incorporation of the Fortezza Crypto Card to perform these
functions.
Peer-to-peer networks
Peer-to-peer networks operate in a distributed fashion and are self-organizing. Many of the
disadvantages of their lack of control and management are compensated by the resilience,
added processing capabilities and added storage facilities that these networks bring to the
wide-area networking space. Schemes such as Pastry (Rowstron & Druschel 2001), Kademlia
(Maymounkov et al. 2002) and Viceroy (Malkhi & Mazieres 2002) use overlay configurations
to provide self-organization, robustness, routing and reliability capabilities. However the
schemes lack security features and this is common to many of the peer-to-peer mechanisms
that rely on Distributed Hash Tables (Lua et al. 2005).
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BitTorrent, as a centralized P2P system, offers some level of security that is missing from
distributed schemes. A centralized server provides hashing information that is used by the
peers to download information and verify its integrity (Lua et al. 2005). However, none of
the known P2P schemes allow for checking the request for a file (combined with a hash of the
file in the request) nor do they check the state of the file prior to transmission. Also, because
of this lack of security, additional authentication and transfer encryption schemes do not
prevent substitution attacks of any given file fragment.
What’s missing?
With the exception of a relatively recent proposal of a Resumable FTP (Grzywa et al. 2001),
the trend towards the development of FTP’s security functions appears to be an expansion of
its core interoperability with other protocols and security mechanisms. Efforts to provide
security for Web Services rely on Secure RPC at best (W3C 2001) (Safford, Hess & Schales
1993), and this in practice only addresses authentication of issued commands. De-facto
standards such as SSH FTP assume that its implementation runs over a secure channel
(Galbraith, Ylonen & Lehtinen 2002) and the fingerprinting process used only applies to the
authentication process and not the file transfer itself (Friedl 2003). Finally, looking at P2P
systems for help is not the answer either: P2P are overlays and they make use of lower level
protocols such as FTP. Therefore, what is missing is further development of the core
processes contained within FTP itself to provide, what we feel is FTP’s principal function, the
delivery of the intended file with its integrity maintained while providing a core error
recovery process in the event of intended or unintentional file corruption both prior and
during the transfer process. Given that “most software is not designed for fail-safe or fail-
secure operation” (Grzywa et al. 2001), development efforts need to be directed at re-
examining core processes in order to produce self-recovering operations.
Our proposal offers a lightweight approach that is integrated at the protocol level. In the
following section, the authors introduce an integrity algorithm known as a Hash Triplet, an
overview of the basic process steps performed with integrating the algorithm into FTP, and a
proposal for using the algorithm in error detection and recovery. Again, we would like to
repeat that the Hash Triplet concept to be presented in the next section may be used for many
data transfer protocols and we have chosen FTP protocol as it is well known around the
world.
Hash Triplets
The underlying function of a Hash Triplet is to facilitate the enforcement and enhancement of
the handshake protocol at a file transfer level. It involves the use of a one-way hash product
generator, which resides on both sides of the file transfer. The hash product generator is used
to create a unique bit stream (commonly 128-bits) that is based on the original file it was
created from. Any changes to the original file will result in a different hash product being
generated. There are occasions when two different files can generate the same hash product.
This is known as a collision and is undesirable for system continuity. Thus, the choice of the
hash product generator must be collision-resistant (low probability of a duplicate being
generated), such as MD5, SHA-1, and RIPEMD-160. The basic security handshake process is
outlined in Figure 2 (Adapted from Colarik 2003). Hash Triplets may use any hash product
generator and recent developments in breaking hash generators (Schneier 2004; CAN 2007)
indicates that tools more powerful than MD5 or SHA-1 should be used in the future.
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Prior to any FTP session, the file to be transferred is stored with a corresponding, previously
generated hash product file (Storage Hash) in the File System. It should also be noted that a
unique file name is used in conjunction with the hash product during storage and transfers,
and as such, further diminishes the hash product duplication issue (collisions) discussed
previously. In step 1, a message containing the file name and its corresponding hash function
is sent. In step 2, the message is received, the hash file (Message Hash) is stored, and a
request for the file is sent with the previously stored Message Hash. In step 3, the system will
generate a new hash (Generated Hash) and compare it with the Message Hash, and the
Storage Hash. The results of the comparison will be checked against the Send Request
Response Table (see Table 1) for the appropriate action.
If the hash products match, the system will initiate the file transfer and include a hash
(Package Hash) in the transfer. If they do not match, the corresponding corrective actions may
be displayed to the user or may initiate some error recovery mechanism appropriate to the
condition. In step 4, the file and Package Hash is received, and the Hash Triplet function is
initiated, and the results compared to the Received File Response Table (see Table 2) for
appropriate action.
Figure 2: Data Transfer Sequence Diagram
The file is saved if the hash functions match. In any case, the corresponding message for the
Hash Triplet is forwarded to the File Originator. In step 5, the message is received. It is in
step 5 that an additional mechanism needs to be developed to take corrective actions in the
event that an error occurred. Throughout the above process, we believe the needed replies can
be integrated into the existing three-digit FTP command structure.
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Proof of concept generation discussion
An application was written in Java and utilized a CORBA compliant object request broker
provided in the Java 2 Platform Standard Edition development kit 1.4 to demonstrate the
concepts presented above. CORBA was selected to provide for the widest range of portability
between systems (Object Management Group 1995). The hash function generator contained
within the source code was based on the 128-bit message digest MD5 model developed by
Rivest (1992). Only the areas shaded in gray in Tables 1 and 2 were applied to the logic of the
Hash Triplets. Simple text files were created and their corresponding hash functions were
generated and saved in separate folders on two different computers connected via a network.
The file transfer process outlined in Figure 3 (steps 1-5) was initiated and tested to determine
that each of the Hash Triplet comparisons were either acted upon, in the case of all three
hashes matching, or an error message was displayed and the process halted. An example of
this would be that prior to the transfer, a text file was modified without the corresponding
storage hash being updated. The result was that the process never progressed past step 3 and
the error message “File has changed since original message, original hash may not have been
updated, confirm file integrity before continuing, regenerate hash and reconfirm” was
displayed.
Table 1: Send Request Response
Scenarios
Request
Hash
Storage
Hash
Generated
Hash
Action Required / Notification Returned
h1 h1 h1 Validated file, integrity confirmed, send file
h1 h1 h2
File has changed since original message, original hash may not have been
updated, confirm file integrity before continuing, regenerate hash and
reconfirm
h1 h2 h2
Message to Recipient is invalid or out of date, may be invalid request, request
retransmission of message
h1 h2 h1
Original hash may be corrupted, update hash file, confirm before transmitting
file
h2 h1 h1
Message to Recipient is invalid or out of date, issue new notification, request
retransmission of message
h2 h2 h1
File has changed since original message, original hash may not have been
updated, confirm file integrity before continuing, regenerate hash and
reconfirm
h2 h1 h2 Original hash may be corrupted, update hash, confirm before transmitting file
S
en
d
R
eq
ue
st
R
es
po
ns
e
h2 h1 h3
Re-evaluate all controls for file, discontinue distribution of file, and
everyone is going to hell in a hand-basket 
Limitations, Considerations, and Implications
This line of research was a direct result of a lateral application of a proof-of-concept
developed, as a module, for a secure patch management system. The development and testing
of the proof-of-concept was restricted to a small, homogeneous environment in which a
limited number of possible combinations were conducted (differing operating systems, file
types, file sizes, number of errors introduced, etc.). As a result, this benign environment does
not simulate the conditions of a network and its systems that are under attack, operating at or
in excess of maximum capacity, or degraded capabilities due to legacy or matured system
infrastructure. However, the basic concept has been proved and future developments and
experiments are now easy to design provided the resources of time and money are available.
This research was a component of PhD thesis work (Colarik 2003) and the financial/time
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constrains allowed only the verification of the concept, leaving room for more extensive tests
in the future.
Table 2: Received File Response
Scenarios
Package
Hash
Message
Hash
Generated
Hash
Action Required / Notification Returned
h1 h1 h1 Validated file, integrity confirmed, store / install / execute / process file
h1 h1 h2 File has changed at or after transport phase, re-request file
h1 h2 h2
Transported package maybe corrupted, originator’s controls may need to be
examined, request retransmission of package
h1 h2 h1
Original hash may be corrupted, package may be invalid, request
notification message again & re-request file
h2 h1 h1 Package to Recipient may be corrupted, request retransmission of package
h2 h2 h1
File has changed since original message, original hash may not have been
updated, confirm file integrity before continuing, regenerate hash and
reconfirm
h2 h1 h2
Original hash may be corrupted, message may be invalid, request message
again and re-request file
R
ec
ei
ve
d
F
il
e
R
es
po
ns
e
h2 h1 h3
Re-evaluate all controls for file, discontinue file request and discard, and
everyone’s going to hell in a hand-basket 
It is intended that our proposal does not exclude additional security mechanisms that are
available for establishing communication sessions, authenticating the users, and validating the
activities performed during these transactions (Abadi & Needham 1996). Mechanisms such as
Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), Secure Socket Layer (SSL), and Kerberos should be
considered in addition to our proposal in the safe transfer of files between systems. In fact, the
integration of keys into the generation of the hash products would assist in authenticating the
sender of the file, and as such, will be considered in future development projects.
With this proposal to secure FTP transactions, we have utilized the existing FTP Architecture
(see Figure 1). We have done so by including the governance of the File System (at least in
part) by simply managing the files’ change status through the use of hash functions. In
addition, we feel that the incorporation of error triangulation becomes significantly more
important when a user conducts file transfers in a server-to-server configuration (see Figure
2). The governance of multiple systems remotely through a third system creates additional
opportunities for error that lower level protocols may not recover from efficiently. Recovering
from these errors without jeopardizing system integrity requires careful and future
consideration.
Conclusions
A basic requirement by users is that files be transferred efficiently and without modification.
File integrity, therefore, becomes a critical element in the sharing of files. During the transfer
of a file, a self-correcting system would permit the user to acquire a file while the error
controls would operate transparently in the background. The key contribution of the Hash
Triplet mechanism presented here is that it identifies the specific points of origin for the root
error causes and allows system designers to promote a wider range of remedies. No similar
system, as far as we know, provides such capability.
We would like to point out that the essence of the Hash Triplet concept is an extension of the
pre-transfer file indicator code properties to the file transfer operation. An analysis of received
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information allows a receiver of a pre-transfer file indicator coded message to quickly
determine not only if the message were transferred correctly but also to quickly locate the
possible error. Hash Triplets provide this type of information.
In this paper, we have discussed the Hash Triplet concept using the FTP protocol since, by
definition, FTP is a protocol designated for the transfer of bulk files. However, we think that
the outlined concept may be applied to many other protocols used for transferring files.
Further research could be designed at this goal. As further research developments occur in
securing the file transfer process, file integrity and error recovery governance may well need
to extend beyond the protocol level and be integrated into any given FTP application program
and/or the operating system itself.
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